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RECENT DECISIONS
can rely on the technicalities of mere building code violations to abro-
gate his lease.
In adopting the exception to the general rule of caveat emptor, as
applied to implied warranties, Wisconsin has afforded a greater degree
of protection to the lessee who leases a furnished dwelling unit for one
year or less, although the exact grounds upon which his remedy can be
sought must await further court interpretation.
EDMUND C. CHMIELINSKI
Conspiracy-Evidentary Value of Conscious Parallelism: The
plaintiff in Delaware Valley Marine Supply Company v. American To-
bacco Company' sought treble damages against five tobacco companies
and their present distributor on the ground that the companies entered
into a conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-trust
Act2 by refusing to sell their tobacco products to the plaintiff. The plain-
tiff sought to organize a ship chandler concern, but, due to its inability
to obtain tobacco products, never commenced to do business. All five
tobacco companies were then selling to the defendant distributing com-
pany Lipschutz Bros., Inc., an already established and reliable firm. In
addition, two of the tobacco companies had a second outlet. Thus it ap-
pears, and the court so found, that the defendant companies already had
adequate representation in the market and that no real need for the
plaintiff's services existed. As is the usual case in actions brought under
Section 1, there was no direct evidence of an expressed agreement be-
tween the defendant companies. The Circuit Court of Appeals in affirm-
ing the trial court's directed verdict for the defendants viewed the evi-
dence most favorable to the plaintiff, thereby deciding the case under
the assumption that the five companies were each aware of the other's
refusal to deal with the plaintiff.
The Sherman Anti-trust provision under which the action was
brought in the main case is relatively clear. Its purpose is to prevent
conspiracies, a conspiracy being "a combination of two or more persons
by concerted action to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose or to
accomplish some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal
or unlawful means."13 The difficulty arises in determining what is suf-
ficient proof of the existence of a conspiracy and then actually obtaining
the necessary quantum of proof. It is not necessary to prove a con-
spiracy by direct evidence of an express agreement, written or oral.
I Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F. 2d
199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, reported in B.N.A., Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep., No. 38, p. A-8 (April 3, 1962).
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1958) : "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
3 EuLER, MONOPOLIES AND FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS §16 (1929).
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Circumstantial evidence has always been enough.4 "Proof of a formal
agreement is unnecessary, and were the law otherwise such conspiracies
would flourish....",
In recent years the theory of conscious parallelism which found its
origin in Interstate Circuit v. United States" has rapidly developed into
a legal doctrine. However, parallel business behavior per se has never
been held to conclusively establish a conspiracy or agreement.' "But that
case and others recognize that such behavior is another item to be
weighed, and generally to be weighed heavily in the determination.""
It was said in Milgram v. Loeuls Inc. that:
This uniformity in policy forms the basis of an inference of
joint actions. This does not mean, however, that in every case
mere consciously parallel business practices are sufficient evi-
dence, in themselves, from which a court may infer concerted
action. Here we add that each distributor refuses to license fea-
tures on first run to a drive-in even if a higher rental is offered.
Each distributor has thus acted in apparent contradiction to its
own self interest. This strenghthens considerably the inference of
conspiracy for the conduct of the distributors is, in the absence
of a valid explanation inconsistent with decisions independently
arrived at.9
The above not only affirms the theory that uniform conduct per se is
not unlawful, but also makes reference to the so-called "plus factors."
"Plus factors" are circumstantial evidence other than uniform action
such as prior misconduct (background of illegal licensing agreements),
raising of prices when surplus existed, policing of dealers, and use of
a delivered price system.' 0 A conspiracy was held to exist in Morton
Salt Co. v. United States where in addition to uniformity of action
"there was a completely free exchange of pricing information" and "any
changes which were of interest to the other salt producers were com-
municated immediately."" The "plus factors" are used to bridge the gap
t United States v. A. Schroder's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920); American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
5 C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United States, 197 F. 2d 489, 494 (9th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952).
6 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). For an interest-
ing argument that the doctrine of "conscious parallelism" arose out of a
misinterpretation of Justice Stone's opinion in the cited case see Handler,
Contract, Cmnbination or Conspiracy, 3 A.B.A. ANTI-TRuST SECTION REP.
38, 40 (1953).
7Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing, Corp., 346 U.S.
537 (1954).
8 Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F. 2d 573, 577 (10th Cir. 1956).
9 Milgram v. Loew's, Inc. 192 F. 2d 579, 583 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 929 (1952).
10 C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United States, supra note 5.
1' Morton Salt Co. v. United States, supra note 8. See also, American Column
and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) (restriction of output) ;
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) (price uni-
formity).
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between fact and inference-from the fact of parallelism to an inference
of conspiracy. Thus the value of "conscious parallelism" varies with the
kind of parallelism and the factual setting in which it is found.12 In the
instant case, in as much as there was no direct evidence of conspiracy,
the plaintiff relied on "conscious parallelism" but did not come forth with
any "plus factors" which appear necessary under the law as it is today.
The plaintiff did try to establish that the defendants acted contrary to
their self interest because the plaintiff offered to pay C.O.D. However,
the court rejected this because there was no evidence that the plaintiff
made a better offer for the defendants' products than the defendants
were already receiving from their present distributor, nor was it shown
that plaintiff could provide better facilities than were furnished by the
present distributor. On the other hand, the defendants showed that they
had adequate representation, and that neither their investigations nor
the plaintiff's applications indicated that the plaintiff "had the experi-
ence, financial responsibility and other attributes which would qualify
it as a potentially successful distributor."'13
It is also of importance that in the principal case there was no com-
plicated system arrived at as in the Morton case 4 (pricing system) nor
any intricate changes in business methods as in the Interstate Circuit
case where the court said:
It taxes credulity to believe that the several distributors would,
in the circumstances, have accepted and put into operation with
substantial unanimity such far reaching changes in their business
methods without some understanding that all were to join, and
we reject as beyond the range of probability that it was the result
of mere chance.1 5
All that was arrived at uniformly in the main case was a simple "no"
answer from five companies to an application for a distributorship. The
court pointed out that if the number of companies involved were greater
than merely five perhaps an inference of concerted action might con-
ceivably be justified, but under the existing circumstances no such in-
ference could be supported.
It is perhaps of some import to note that the defendants in the
principal case argued that there could be no finding of "conscious paral-
lelism" because the manner of rejection of the plaintiff's applications
was not uniform, but the court held that it was not necessary for the
manner of rejection to be uniform as long as there was uniformity of
action on a crucial point, namely the fact of rejection. "If it were other-
12 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study th . Anti-
. trust Laws 39-40 (1955).
13 Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. Y. American Tobacco Co., supra note 1,
at 206.
14 Morton Salt'Co.'v. United States, supra note 8.
'5 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, supra note 6. at. 223.
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wise, a charge of conspiracy could always be avoided by agreeing to go
home by different roads." 16
In applying "conscious parallelism" as an aid in proving conspiracy,
it must be kept in mind that in almost every case there are hypotheses
other than conspiracy which could explain away the parallel behavior
of the alleged conspirators. Parallel behavior in itself is not mystifying.
It is common that in small groups, even without communication, oral
or written, individuals become aware of their group membership and
adjust to a mode of behavior which reflects the group's objectives and,
to a degree sublimates individual ones." In the words of Handler"
"... rational beings necessarily react the same way to common stimuli.
People wear raincoats or use umbrellas in a rainstorm. Human behavior
is no different in the domain of economics. Every prudent seller will
deny credit to a bad risk."
Thus the doctrine of "conscious parallelism" is not carried to ex-
tremes and business behavior is not restricted merely because of knowl-
edge of a competitor's actions. Sorkin suggests that "only when the
pattern of (behavior) is so involved and complex as to render it im-
probable that the similarity of pattern is the result of anything other
than agreement"'1 should an inference of agreement be drawn.
In essence the instant case will afford similarly charged defendants
with a ready defense to the contention that industry wide rejection of a
new customer "per se" amounts to dealing contrary to one's economic
self-interest.
IVICHAEL J. DOYLE
16 Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 1,
at 204.
7 Phillips and Hall, The Salk Vaccine Case: Parallelism, Conspiracy and Other
Hypotheses, 46 VA. L. REV. 717 (1960).
18 Handler, Anti-trust-New Frontiers and New Perplexities, 6 THE REcoRD 59,
65 (1951).19 Sorkin, Conscious Parallelism 2 ANTI-TRUST BULL. 281, 301 (1957).
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